3	Eyal Even-Dar and Asaf Shapira. A Note on Maximizing the Spread of Influence in Social Networks

6 	Benton McCune. Extending Polynomial Time Computability to Markets with Demand Correspondences

18 	Rahul Garg and Sanjiv Kapoor. Market Equilibrium using Auctions for a Class of Gross-Substitute Utilities

25 	Yair Halevi and Yishay Mansour. A Network Creation Game with Nonuniform Interests

41 	Itai Ashlagi, Andrey Klinger and Moshe Tennenholtz. K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-Cooperative Computation

5 	Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, T-H. Hubert Chan and MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi. Making Money by Pricing Below Cost

4 	Aries Wei Sun. Monotone Properties of Randomized Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

9 	Felix Brandt and Felix Fischer. PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution

11 	Eyal Even-Dar, Michael Kearns and Jennifer Wortman. Sponsored Search with Contexts

17 	Martin Gairing and Florian Schoppmann. Total Latency in Singleton Congestion Games

20 	Sudhir Singh, Vwani Roychowdhury, Himawan Gunadhi and Behnam Rezaei. Capacity constraints and the inevitability of mediators in adword auctions

26 	Arpita Ghosh, Hamid Nazerzadeh and Mukund Sundararajan. Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search

29 	Zoe Abrams and Michael Schwarz. Ad Auction Design and User Experience

37 	Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvo-Armengol and David Parkes. The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games

12 	Nimrod Megiddo and Vijay Vazirani. Continuity Properties of Equilibrium Prices and Allocations in Linear Fisher Markets

7 	Kurt Nielsen and Tomas Toft. Secure Relative Performance Scheme

21 	Stefania Di Giannantonio, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli, Mordechai Shalom and Shmuel Zaks. Selfishness, Collusion and Power of Local Search for the ADMs

23 	Hossein Falaki. The Wi-Fi Roaming Game

33 	Zoe Abrams and Erik Vee. Personalized Ad Delivery when Ads Fatigue: An Approximation Algorithm

2 	Qiqi Yan. On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions

13 	Zoe Abrams, Arpita Ghosh and Erik Vee. Cost of Conciseness in Sponsored Search Auctions

14 	Kuzman Ganchev, Alex Kulesza, Jinsong Tan, Ryan Gabbard, Qian Liu and Michael Kearns. Empirical Price Modeling for Sponsored Search

27 	Mohammad Mahdian and Kerem Tomak. Pay-per-action model for online advertising

28 	Chinmay Karande and nikhil devanur. Computing Market Equilibrium: Beyond Weak Gross Substitutes

30 	Deeparnab Chakrabarty and Nikhil Devanur. On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility

31 	Atish Das Sarma, Deeparnab Chakrabarty and Sreenivas Gollapudi. Public Advertisement Broker Markets

34 	Gagan Goel and Aranyak Mehta. Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids

35 	Shishir Bharathi, David Kempe and Mahyar Salek. Competitive Influence Maximization in Social Networks

38 	Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen and Elan Pavlov. Characterizing Truthful Market Design

39 	Rica Gonen and Elan Pavlov. An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism delta-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget